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Abstract
Although some argue that tokenism drives the selection of female directors, we show
that they have a signiﬁcant impact on measures of board eﬀectiveness. In a large panel
of data on publicly-traded ﬁrms from 1996-2003, we ﬁnd that (1) the likelihood that
a female director has attendance problems is 0.29 lower than for a male director, (2)
male directors have fewer attendance problems the greater the fraction of female directors
on the board, (3) ﬁrms with more diverse boards provide their directors with more pay-
performance incentives, and (4) ﬁrms with more diverse boards have more board meetings.
We also show that the positive relationship between corporate performance measures and
gender diversity documented by previous studies is not robust to attempts to address the
endogeneity of diversity. Instead, the average eﬀect of gender diversity on both market
valuation and operating performance appears to be negative. This negative eﬀect is driven
by companies with greater shareholder rights. In ﬁrms with weaker shareholder rights,
gender diversity has positive eﬀects. Our results suggest that diverse boards are tougher
monitors. Nevertheless, mandating gender quotas in the boardroom may not increase
board eﬀectiveness on average, but may reduce it for well-governed ﬁrms where additional
monitoring is counterproductive.
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It is widely argued that women face a glass ceiling when it comes to holding top corporate
oﬃcer positions.1 Partly because they hold so few oﬃcer positions, women also hold few board
seats. In the US, women held 13.6% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2003 (Catalyst, 2003). The
percentage of female directors in Australia, Canada, Japan and Europe is estimated to be 8.7%,
10.6%, 0.4% and 8%, respectively (see Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency
(EOWA), 2006, and European Professional Women’s Network (EPWN), 2004). Furthermore,
many ﬁrms have only one female director which is often regarded as evidence of tokenism (see
the discussion in Branson, 2006; Bourez, 2005, and Corporate Women Directors International
(CWDI), 2007).2
This situation is likely to change because boards around the world are under increasing
pressure to choose female directors. Many recent proposals for governance reform explicitly
stress the importance of gender diversity in the boardroom. In the UK, the Higgs Report
“Review of the Role and Eﬀectiveness of Non-Executive Directors” (Higgs, 2003), commissioned
by the British Department of Trade and Industry, argued that diversity could enhance board
eﬀectiveness (see also “The Tyson Report” (Tyson, 2003) on the recruitment and development
of non-executive directors). If companies don’t voluntarily see to it that 25% of their directors
are female, Sweden has threatened to make diversity a legal requirement (see the discussion
in Medland, 2004). The most extreme promotion of gender diversity occurs in Norway, where
since 2006 all listed companies must abide by a 40% gender quota for female directors or face
delisting.
One argument for such measures is that boards could enhance their eﬀectiveness by tapping
broader talent pools for their directors. The Higgs Review, for example, points out that although
approximately 30% of managers in the UK corporate sector are female, women hold only 6%
1For example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) found that women comprised only 2.5% of the 5 highest paid exec-
utives in the S&P 1500 from 1992-1997 and earned 45% less than men. While they argue that job characteristics
explain part of this gap, others interpret their ﬁndings to be evidence of the glass ceiling.
2For example, in the top 200 companies in Europe, 62% of companies have at least one female director, but
only 28% have more than one in 2004 (EWPN, 2004). In Australia, 50% of ASX200 companies have at least
one female director, but only 13.5% have more than one in 2006 (EOWA, 2006).
1of non-executive director positions. Precisely because they do not belong to the “old boys
club,” female directors may more closely correspond to the concept of the independent director
emphasized in theory. Nevertheless, for several reasons it is not clear that adding female
directors will enhance board eﬀectiveness. For example, if female directors are chosen merely
because of tokenism, their impact is likely to be minimal. Kanter (1977) argues that the contrast
between tokens and the numeric majority may lead to both social and professional isolation
of tokens. Subsequent tokenism research found evidence consistent with this hypothesis (e.g.
Yoder, 1991). This suggests that token female directors are unlikely to be able to inﬂuence
board eﬀectiveness. Even if they can, if the eﬀect of increasing gender diversity is to increase
board independence, gender diversity should enhance board eﬀectiveness only where greater
independence is valuable.3
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between board eﬀectiveness and
gender diversity, which we measure using the fraction of female directors on the board. In
particular, we ask the following questions. First, do boards with greater gender diversity
look diﬀerent? If so, does diversity lead them to perform diﬀerently in terms of governance?
Finally, does the eﬀect of gender diversity on governance matter suﬃciently to aﬀect corporate
performance?
The answers to these questions are interesting for several reasons. Most directly, they can
shed light on whether tokenism prevents female directors from having an impact. They can also
further our understanding of the eﬀect group composition has on board eﬀectiveness and the
likely success or failure of recent governance proposals advocating greater diversity. Despite the
importance of gender diversity in the policy debate, there is still relatively little research linking
diversity and corporate governance (for a survey of this literature, see Fields and Keys, 2003).
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) document a positive relationship between gender and
3Other beneﬁts and costs of gender diversity can be found in the ﬁnance and management literatures.
For example, Ellis and Keys (2003) describe the idea that more diverse boards may have better relations with
customers, suppliers and employees. On the other hand, management scholars have also pointed out that diverse
top management teams may disagree more (e.g. Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997) or underperform
(see the survey by Milliken and Martins, 1996).
2ethnic diversity of the board and corporate performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q.4 Farrell and
Hersch (2005) ﬁnd that gender systematically impacts the selection of directors to the board.
However, when they examine the market’s reaction to the announcement of the addition of
female directors, the abnormal returns are insigniﬁcant. Rather than being performance based,
they argue that their evidence is consistent with the idea that female directors are added to
the board following internal or external calls for diversity. These papers do not fully address
the endogeneity problems that arise because of diﬀerences in corporate culture across ﬁrms or
reverse causality. Thus, their ﬁndings cannot always be given causal interpretations. Our paper
complements these by providing a more comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of gender diversity
in boards with an emphasis on the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects.5
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature on the demography of organizations,
which has been studied primarily by researchers in management and organization theory, but
also increasingly in economics and corporate ﬁnance. Pfeﬀer’s (1983) concept of organizational
demography deals with the description of organizations “in terms of their sex composition,
their racial composition, their age or length of service distributions, the educational level of
their work forces, the socioeconomic origins of their members, and so forth” (p. 303). Empir-
ical papers in this tradition have looked both at the eﬀects of demography on outcomes and
at the determinants of demography in organizations (Haveman, 1995; O’Reilly, Caldwell, and
Barnett, 1989; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin, 1999; Wagner, Pfeﬀer, and O’Reilly, 1984). In
the economics and ﬁnance literature, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Agrawal and Knoe-
ber (2001) document that ﬁrms appear to optimally choose directors for their characteristics.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Bennedsen, Péréz-Gonzalez and
Wolfenzon (2007) provide evidence that personal characteristics of CEOs aﬀect corporate poli-
cies. Bertrand and Schoar ﬁnd that older CEOs pursue more conservative corporate strategies,
4Similar results have been documented by Adler (2001), although the focus of this study is more broadly on
the gender diversity of senior management.
5Our paper also contributes to a large, mainly experimental, literature exploring whether women behave
diﬀerently than men in diﬀerent situations (see the survey by Croson and Gneezy, 2004). In the context of
ﬁnancial decision-making, Charness and Gneezy (2004) argue that women commonly invest less than men in
experimental settings. Using data from an account brokerage, Barber and Odean (2001) ﬁnd that women trade
less, which leads them to outperform men.
3while CEOs with MBAs are more aggressive. Malmendier and Tate show that measures of a
CEO’s overconﬁdence are related to ﬁrm outcomes. Bennedsen, Péréz-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon
(2007) ﬁnd that the death of immediate family members of CEOs have a negative impact on
ﬁrm performance, suggesting that personal circumstances of the CEO are important for ﬁrm
policies. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) argue that executives’ characteristics only impact
corporate outcomes when they have inﬂuence over decision-making. This argument suggests
that female directors can only matter when they are not isolated as tokens.6
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we analyze the relationship between gender diversity
and several measures of board behavior and structure that the literature associates with good
governance. Speciﬁcally, we focus on director attendance behavior at board meetings, director
pay and the number of board meetings.7 We address important endogeneity concerns in this
analysis using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. Although it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd valid instruments in
this context, as a robustness check we also use an instrumental variable approach. Next, we use
similar empirical techniques to analyze the relationship between gender diversity and measures
of corporate performance.
We ﬁnd that gender diversity has signiﬁcant eﬀects on board governance. Women appear to
behave diﬀerently than men with respect to our measure of attendance behavior. Speciﬁcally,
women are less likely to have attendance problems than men. Furthermore, the greater the
fraction of women on the board, the better is the attendance behavior of male directors. Boards
with more gender diversity also have more performance pay and more board meetings.
These results suggest that women have a positive impact on board governance. In partic-
ular, diverse boards appear to be tougher monitors: directors (both male and female) attend
6In the accounting literature there has also been a recent trend towards examining the eﬀect of gender
on accounting outcomes although the ﬁndings have been mixed. Green, Jegadeesh, Tang (2007) examine the
impact of gender on earnings estimates of analysts and ﬁnd that female analysts are less accurate. In contrast,
Kumar (2007) ﬁnds that female analysts make bold and accurate estimates. Krishnan and Parson (2006) ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with more diverse top management teams in terms of gender have higher earnings quality. The fact
that gender appears to aﬀect policy outcomes has been documented by Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004), in a
quite diﬀerent context from the one we examine. They ﬁnd that gender aﬀects investments in public goods by
village representatives in India.
7Although we also analyzed the relationship between director independence and board size and gender
diversity, we do not present this analysis here. As we discuss later, we believe these relationships are largely
mechanical and diﬃcult to interpret.
4more meetings, schedule more meetings, and a larger fraction of their compensation is equity-
based. However, although the correlation between the gender diversity of the board and either
ﬁrm value or operating performance appears to be positive at ﬁrst inspection, this correlation
disappears once we apply reasonable procedures to tackle omitted variables and reverse causal-
ity problems. Our results suggest that, on average, ﬁrms perform worse the greater the gender
diversity of the board. While this result appears counter-intuitive, some theoretical papers
argue that boards that do not monitor too intensively may be equilibrium phenomena (e.g.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)). Others argue that too much board monitoring can decrease
shareholder value (e.g. Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2007)). Thus,
it is possible that diversity only adds value when additional board monitoring is needed. To
test this hypothesis, we examine whether diversity aﬀects performance diﬀerentially in ﬁrms
with diﬀerent levels of shareholder rights deﬁned using IRRC governance data as in Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2003). Consistent with this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that diversity has beneﬁcial
eﬀects in companies with weak shareholder rights, where it is plausible that additional board
monitoring can enhance value, but detrimental eﬀects in companies with strong shareholder
rights.
Although female directors may be chosen because of tokenism, our results show that they
are able to impact board governance. In addition, gender seems to matter even after we control
for measurable characteristics of directors, such as age, tenure, retirement status and number
of other directorships. Nevertheless, our results suggest that mandating gender quotas in the
boardroom may not increase board eﬀectiveness on average, but may reduce it for well-governed
ﬁrms where additional monitoring is counterproductive.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We discuss our data and basic facts about female
representation on corporate boards in our sample in Section 2. In Section 3, we examine
the relationship between gender diversity and board governance. We analyze the relationship
between diversity and performance in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that our results are not
driven by observable characteristics of female directors. Section 6 concludes.
52. Data
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director-level data for S&P 500, S&P
MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap ﬁrms collected by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) for the period 1996-2003. This dataset is in part based on an IRRC annual publication
(Board Practices/Board Pay: the Structure and Compensation of Boards of Directors at S&P
1,500 Companies). It contains information on directors from company proxy statements or
annual reports, such as the director’s gender, the number of other directorships each director
holds, the director’s tenure as director, age and retirement status. The SEC requires that in
their proxy statements companies report the names of directors who during the previous ﬁscal
year attended fewer than 75 percent of the total number of board and committee meetings they
were supposed to attend. For all but two directors in our sample, the IRRC indicates whether
they met this attendance threshold. The IRRC data also contain a classiﬁcation of director
independence. Directors are classiﬁed as independent if they have no business relationship
with the ﬁrm, are not related or interlocked with management and are not current or former
employees.8 Directors who are not independent are either classiﬁed as inside directors, who are
current employees, or aﬃliated directors, who have signiﬁcant business or family relationships
with the ﬁrm. Because director characteristics were not always collected in a consistent manner,
we perform several steps to clean the data, which we describe in more detail in Appendix A.
To obtain ﬁnancial data, director compensation data and the number of board meetings
during each ﬁscal year, we merge our data with ExecuComp. We obtain SIC codes and business
segment data from Compustat and stock prices from CRSP.9 Our ﬁnal sample of complete
director and ﬁrm level data consists of 86,714 directorships (director-ﬁrm-years) in 8,253 ﬁrm-
years of data on 1,939 ﬁrms whose number varies from a minimum of 968 (in 1996) to a
8Because it is the most diﬃcult to collect, the independence of a director is the most likely to be measured
with error. However, all of our results are robust to excluding board independence from our regressions, which
suggests that the measurement error is white noise. These results are available upon request.
9In the original IRRC data, ﬁrms are assigned to industries according to two digit codes prior to 2003 and
according to four digit codes in 2003. All industry codes are missing for 1996. Thus, we use the SIC codes from
Compustat to assign ﬁrms to industries.
6maximum of 1,146 (in 1997).10
Table 1A shows descriptive statistics for selected ﬁrm, board and director characteristics.
In our analysis, we use a market-based measure of performance, a proxy for Tobin’s Q, as well
as an accounting measure, return on assets (ROA). Our proxy for Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the
ﬁrm’s market value to its book value. The ﬁrm’s market value is calculated as the book value
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. ROA is the ratio of
net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to its book value of assets.
Our measure of ﬁrm risk or volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns from
CRSP over the previous ﬁve years.
Directors are generally paid an annual retainer, meeting fees for attendance at board meet-
ings and some stock-based compensation in the form of restricted shares or options. Each
director faces the same compensation schedule. We deﬁne total (individual) director compen-
sation to be the sum of the annual retainer, the meeting fee times the number of board meetings
and the value of all stock-based compensation. We discuss how we value stock-based compen-
sation in Appendix B. For comparison purposes, we convert all director compensation variables
into 2003 dollars using the CPI-U.
(Insert Table 1A about here)
2 . 1 .W o m e ni nt h eb o a r d r o o m - t h eb a s i cf a c t s
The IRRC dataset contains data on 24,820 unique directors holding a total of 125,319 direc-
torships (ﬁrm-year board positions).11 Women constitute 2,012 or 8.11% of directors, holding
8.87% of directorships. These numbers are consistent with Farrell and Hersch (2005), who ﬁnd
that female directors comprise 8.6% of board members in a sample of approximately 300 un-
regulated Fortune 500 ﬁrms over the period 1990 to 1999. Although it focuses on large ﬁrms,
the 1999 Catalyst census of female directors documents only about 10% female directors in the
10The number of observations may vary across regressions due to multicollinearity and perfect prediction of
the dependent variable. In some cases, we are able to exploit more of the merged data in our regressions.
11In this section, we use the entire IRRC database, not just the subsample for which we have complete data, to
provide a broader picture of female representation in the boardroom. The summary statistics in our subsample
are very similar.
7Fortune 1000 (Catalyst, 1999). Women act as inside directors in only 727 (6.64%) female board
positions. They serve primarily as independent directors (9,345 or 84.07% of female board po-
sitions) or aﬃliated directors (1,044 or 9.39% of female board positions). The primary reasons
they are classiﬁed as aﬃliated are because they provide professional services to the ﬁrm (39.75%
of aﬃliated directorships), they are related to a member of management (26.62%), they act on
behalf of a supplier (19.44%), as a union or large shareholder representative (15.57%), or are
former employees (13.02%). The second to last reason they are classiﬁed as aﬃliated is because
they act on behalf of a charity the company donates to (0.4% of aﬃliated directorships).
The percentage of board seats women occupy has increased somewhat over time, rising from
8.10% in 1996 to 10.41% in 2003. Similarly, Catalyst (2003) ﬁnds that the proportion of board
seats women held in the Fortune 500 rose from 9.6% in 1996 to 13.6% in 2003. The average
fraction of women on the board in the IRRC data is 8.25%, rising from 7.5% in 1996 to 9.8%
in 2003. In 1996, 59.57% of ﬁrms had at least one woman on the board; in 2003, 65.01% of
ﬁrms had female directors. However, the proportion of ﬁr m sw i t ho n l yo n ew o m a no nt h eb o a r d
remained roughly the same throughout the sample period. In 1996, 39.29% of ﬁrms had only
one female director. In 2003, 39.88% of ﬁrms had only one female director. Thus, the majority
of ﬁrms with female directors have only one and this pattern has not changed much over time.
2.2. Firms with female directors-are they diﬀerent?
An interesting question is whether ﬁrms with female directors are diﬀerent from those without.
There are several reasons why this might be the case. For example, women may be more likely
to be on the board of ﬁrms in particular industries. The fact that in 2003 women hold 9.8% of
board seats in our sample but 13.6% of board seats in the Fortune 500 (Catalyst, 2003) suggests
that large ﬁrms may be more likely to select female directors than small ﬁrms. One reason could
be because larger ﬁrms have more diverse workforces, so it may be more important to have
diverse leadership. To examine potential diﬀerences among ﬁrms with female board members,
we examine the presence of female directors across industries and compare characteristics of
8ﬁrms with and without female directors in Tables 1B and 1C.
(Insert Table 1B about here)
Tables 1B provides summary statistics for the fraction of women on boards, the fraction of
ﬁrms with at least one woman on the board and the fraction with only one woman on the board
by two-digit SIC codes sorted by the fraction of women on the board. The 5 industries with
the lowest average fraction of women on the board are Special Trade Contractors (SIC 17), Oil
and Gas Extraction (SIC 13), Transportation Services (SIC 47), Water Transportation (SIC
44) and Electronic and Other Equipment (SIC 36). The 5 industries with the highest average
fraction of women on the board are Leather and Leather Products (SIC 31), Tobacco Products
(SIC 21), Apparel and Accessory Stores (SIC 56), Food Stores (SIC 54) and Real Estate (SIC
65). Thus, female directors are less prevalent in ﬁrms that deal with infrastructure, energy
or electronics than with consumer products. Casual observation suggests that the consumers
of the products from the latter 5 SIC codes are more likely to be diverse. Having a woman’s
perspective may be particularly valuable in such industries.
(Insert Table 1C about here)
In Table 1C, we compare the means of various ﬁrm characteristics across ﬁrms with at least
one woman on the board and ﬁrms without women for our sample. The comparison shows that
ﬁrms with female directors are larger, have more business segments, have worse performance
in terms of Tobin’s Q, but better performance in terms of ROA and have lower volatility than
ﬁrms without female directors. While it is not immediately clear whether ﬁrms with women are
necessarily better performers, as Catalyst (2004) argues, the other comparisons suggest that
ﬁrms’ choices to nominate female directors are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by ﬁrm and industry
characteristics. Thus, it is important to control for these characteristics in our analysis, as we
do.
93. Gender diversity and board governance
To examine whether diversity can enhance board eﬀectiveness, as recent governance proposals
argue, we ﬁrst examine whether governance characteristics of boards that are more diverse are
diﬀerent from those that are less diverse. Consistent with the governance literature, which
measures the independence of the board by the fraction of independent directors on the board,
we measure the gender diversity of the board by the fraction of women on the board. In the
numerator we include female inside directors, but because there are so few of them our results
are robust to excluding them.
The governance characteristics we examine are director attendance behavior at board meet-
ings, director pay and the number of board meetings. A large literature suggests that women
behave diﬀerently than men in a variety of experimental settings (see e.g. Croson and Gneezy,
2004). However, it is not clear that we should expect female directors to behave diﬀerently than
male directors. It is possible that all corporate directors share certain personality traits and
that the women who become corporate directors are those who have these personality traits in
common with male directors. But, if female directors always behave the same as male directors,
we would not expect to ﬁnd that diversity has any impact on board governance. Thus, we begin
our analysis by examining the attendance behavior of directors at board meetings. Attendance
behavior is interesting because it is the only measure of individual director behavior publicly
available, so we can use it to examine whether female directors behave diﬀerently than male
directors. Attendance behavior is also important from a governance perspective because the
primary way in which directors obtain necessary information to carry out their duties is by
attending board meetings. This is emphasized by bank regulators in particular. The OCC’s
Director’s Book (1997), for example, lists attendance a tb o a r da n dc o m m i t t e em e e t i n g sa st h e
ﬁrst out of ﬁve tasks a director can perform to be diligent in carrying out his duties. This
suggest that a better governed board is one with better attendance behavior by directors.
We examine the relation between diversity and equity-based compensation for directors
because the governance literature suggests that performance pay is an important mechanism
10to ensure that directors act in the interests of shareholders (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).
We also examine the relation between diversity and total pay, although it is less clear whether
better governance requires more or less total pay. Finally, we examine the relation between
diversity and the number of board meetings. Since board meetings are an important source
of information, more board meetings should enable directors to be more eﬀective. Also, as
discussed in Vafeas (1999), directors are often criticized for devoting too little time to the ﬁrms
on whose boards they sit, for example, when they take on additional directorships. Holding
more board meetings may be one way of ensuring directors spend suﬃcient time with the ﬁrm.
Vafeas (1999) ﬁnds evidence consistent with the idea that board meetings serve an important
monitoring function.12
Although we also analyzed the relationship between director independence and board size
and gender diversity, we do not show this analysis. We believe these relationships are largely
mechanical and diﬃcult to interpret. For example, suppose that, as in Norway, regulators force
a ﬁrm that previously had no women on the board to hire at least one woman. As a consequence,
both board independence and board size would increase. Thus, although it is the increase in the
number of women that is the “cause” of the increase in board size and independence, this is a
mechanical relationship with no interesting economic implications.13 However, we are careful in
our analysis to control for board size and independence to ensure that the eﬀects we document
are due to gender diversity and not those variables.
When estimating the relationship between board governance and gender diversity, clear
endogeneity concerns arise because of omitted unobservable ﬁrm characteristics. It is plausible,
for example, that some ﬁrms are more “progressive” than others, so they have both better
governance, as well as more female directors. Under the assumption that corporate culture
12Building upon arguments put forth by Blau (1977) and others, Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois (1997)
argue that a beneﬁt of diverse top management teams is that team members are able to provide diﬀerent
perspectives onimportantissues, whichmay reduce the probability of complacency in decision-making. However,
since team members with diﬀerent opinions are likely to disagree more, they also stress the importance of
increasing the number of interactions between team members. Unless they learn to understand the viewpoints
of dissenting members, teams members cannot work cooperatively. These arguments also suggest that to be
eﬀective a diverse board should have more board meetings.
13Not surprisingly, in our sample board size and independence are on average both signiﬁcantly larger in ﬁrms
with female directors.
11does not vary much over time, which we believe is reasonable given that our panel is relatively
short, we can use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to address the concern that omitted culture is driving our
results. Another potential concern is reverse causality. However, the case for reverse causality
is less clear for some governance mechanisms than others. In addition, it is well-known that in
t h ec o n t e x to fc o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to ﬁnd valid instruments. Nevertheless, for
the sake of completeness, we carry out an instrumental variable analysis as a robustness check
in section 3.4.
3.1. Attendance at board meetings
If gender diversity is to aﬀe c tt h ew o r k i n g so ft h eb o a r d ,w ea r g u et h a ti tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
a) female directors behave diﬀerently than male directors in at least some respects and b) their
presence aﬀects the behavior of the board, i.e. there are some spillover eﬀects. Thus, we begin by
analyzing directors’ attendance behavior. We examine ﬁrst whether male and female directors
exhibit diﬀerent attendance behavior, then we examine whether gender diversity inﬂuences the
attendance behavior of male directors.
We estimate a probit model in our directorship-level data in which the dependent variable
is 1 if the ﬁrm’s proxy reports that the director did not meet the SEC attendance threshold
in a given year and 0 otherwise.14 To interpret the results correctly, it is important to keep in
mind that the dependent variable indicates those directors who missed more than 25% of the
meetings they were supposed to attend, i.e. they experienced considerable attendance problems.
Clearly, directors will not want to be named in proxies as having attendance problems, thus it
is not surprising that the percentage of observations in which directors do not meet the 75%
attendance threshold is small, 2.38%. Nevertheless, director characteristics aﬀect this extreme
measure of attendance problems in ways one would expect them to aﬀect actual attendance
behavior, as we show below.
Because the factors that cause insiders to fail to meet the 75% attendance threshold are
14Here we follow the same approach as in Adams and Ferreira (2006), which is the only prior analysis of
director attendance behavior we are aware of. Unlike that paper, this one focuses on the eﬀect of gender on the
behavior of male and female directors separately.
12unlikely to be the same as for outsiders, we ﬁrst restrict our sample to outside directors. We
also eliminate all observations in which the director’s tenure is equal to one year. This ensures
that we do not consider directors who were appoi n t e di nt h em i d d l eo ft h ep r e v i o u sy e a ra n d
were unable to meet the attendance threshold because of prior commitments.
We include a set of board, director and ﬁrm characteristics that are plausibly related to
director attendance behavior. For example, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) argue
that as directors accumulate more directorships in other ﬁrms, they may become too busy to
carry out their duties. This suggests that directors’ opportunity cost of time increases with
more directorships. Thus, we include the number of directorships directors hold in other ﬁrms
as a control along with their tenure on the board, age and retirement status. We include some
board level controls such as the meeting fee (see also the discussion in Adams and Ferreira,
2006), total director compensation excluding meeting fees, the number of board meetings, board
size, and board independence (the fraction of independent directors on the board). Because
independent directors are supposed to improve governance, we expect that director attendance
behavior should improve with greater board independence. Finally, in the set of ﬁrm-level
controls we include the two performance measures, Tobin’s Q and ROA, a proxy for ﬁrm size,
here the natural logarithm of sales, and the volatility of stock returns. All speciﬁcations include
year dummies. All standard errors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and, in the
speciﬁcations without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, group correlation within directorship (director-ﬁrm)
units.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
Our main explanatory variable in column I of Table 2 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the
director is female. Because women may be overrepresented in some industries, as our summary
statistics suggest, we include 2-digit SIC industry dummies in this speciﬁcation. The signs of
the coeﬃcients on the right-hand side variables are consistent with expectations. For example,
meeting fees are negatively correlated with the likelihood a director has attendance problems.
Board size is positively correlated with attendance problems, as one might expect if directors
free-ride more in bigger boards. It is also interesting to note that the likelihood of attendance
13problems is signiﬁcantly negatively related to board independence.
The coeﬃcient on the female dummy is negative and signiﬁcant, which suggests that female
directors are less likely to experience attendance problems than male directors. To ensure that
this result is not driven by the fact that most female directors are classiﬁed as independent
and independent directors may have better attendance records than aﬃliated directors, we
perform a robustness check by restricting the sample to independent directors. The results are
very similar. The coeﬃcient on the female dummy in the restricted sample is -0.113 with a
signiﬁcance greater than 1%. Thus, independence does not appear to be driving our results.
In column II, we investigate whether the better attendance behavior of women has spillover
eﬀects on the behavior of male directors. We restrict the sample to male directors and include
the fraction of female directors as the main explanatory variable. The coeﬃcient on the fraction
o ff e m a l ed i r e c t o r si sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level. Thus, male directors appear to
have fewer attendance problems the more diverse the board is.
It is possible that our results are driven by omitted unobserved ﬁrm characteristics, such
as corporate culture. Some ﬁrms may be more likely to appoint women to their boards and
may also encourage better attendance behavior of directors. To control for this possibility, in
columns III and IV, we estimate a linear probability model of the speciﬁcations in columns I
and II and include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient estimates on the female dummy and the
fraction of female directors remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level in column III and at the 10% level
in column IV. If we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the restricted sample of independent directors
as above, the coeﬃcient on the female dummy becomes -0.008 with a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
Thus, the results are robust to the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
We report the marginal eﬀects of our main explanatory variables, evaluated at the means of
the data, beneath their z-statistics in Table 2. We can use these to assess whether the gender
eﬀects are also economically signiﬁcant. The results in column I suggest that if a director is
female, the likelihood she has attendance problems decreases by 0.007. Given that the fraction
of attendance problems in our data is 0.024, this amounts to a decrease in attendance problems
of roughly 29.17%. From column II, a one-standard deviation increase in the fraction of female
14directors, 0.083, is associated with a 0.002 reduced likelihood that a male director has attendance
problems. The fraction of male directors with attendance problems in our data is also 0.024.
Thus, this amounts to an 8.99% reduction in male director attendance problems.
The results above suggest that the overall attendance behavior of directors improves the
more women are on the board. We conﬁrm this by regressing the total number of directors
named as having attendance problems in a given year on the fraction of women on the board and
the ﬁrm-level averages of all other right hand side variables from column I including industry
dummies. The coeﬃcient on the fraction of women is -0.328 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Similarly, the total number of male attendance problems is negatively and signiﬁcantly related
to the fraction of female directors.15
Our conclusion is that even after controlling for director characteristics such as indepen-
dence, age, tenure, retirement status and number of other directorships, female directors ap-
pear to behave diﬀerently than male directors.16 This is consistent with a large experimental
literature arguing that women are intrinsically diﬀerent from men (see Croson and Gneezy,
2004). However, it is also consistent with Kanter’s (1977) theory of tokenism, since she ar-
gues that because tokens are more visible, they are under more performance pressure. This
can leave them to perform worse than members of the numeric majority, but can also induce
better performance at the individual level.17 What is perhaps even more interesting is that the
presence of women has a positive impact on the attendance behavior of male directors. This
appears counter to the idea that women will have no inﬂuence over board processes because of
tokenism. In addition, the presence of women appears to inﬂuence board behavior in ways that
are consistent with better governance; in this case, better governance is promoted by improved
15For the sake of brevity, we do not report these additional regressions. They are available upon request.
16It is possible that female directors behave diﬀerently because they are held to higher standards than male
directors. To shed some light on this we examined the relation between directors’ past attendance records (the
number of times a directors was named as having attendance problems during his tenure up until a given year)
and the likelihood directors leave the board the following year. We ﬁnd that past attendance records have a
signiﬁcant positive correlation with the likelihood of departure even after controlling for proxies for directors’
opportunity cost of time. However, the eﬀect of a director’s attendance record is not diﬀerent if the director
is female, i.e. female directors do not seem to be punished more for poor attendance behavior. Although we
cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary departures, we believe the results are still suggestive.
17However, we do not ﬁnd that women’s attendance behavior is sensitive to the fraction of male directors on
the board, as one might expect if being in the numeric minority induces greater performance pressure.
15attendance.
3.2. Director pay and diversity
In this section, we examine the relationship between director pay and gender diversity at the
ﬁrm level. We focus on two aspects of director pay: the fraction of equity-based pay they receive
and their total pay. We examine the fraction of equity-based pay because it is reasonable to
assume that shares and options provide more performance-based incentives than salaries. We
also examine total pay, although theory does not provide a clear prediction for the correlation
of total pay with better governance. On the one hand, better governed ﬁrms will be less likely
to overpay their directors. On the other hand, if better governed ﬁr m sh a v em o r ee q u i t y - b a s e d
pay, standard principal-agent theories predict that they should also have higher total pay in
order to compensate for extra risk.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
In columns I and II of Table 3, we analyze the relationship between the fraction of equity-
based pay and gender diversity. Because the fraction of equity pay is bounded between 0 and
1, we use its logtransform as our dependent variable.18 Principal agent theory suggests that
volatility should be a key explanatory factor for the fraction of equity-based pay. In addition to
volatility, our controls include board size, board independence, log(sales) as a proxy for ﬁrm size,
the number of business segments as a proxy for ﬁrm complexity, Tobin’s Q and ROA. We use
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to address the concern that diversity is endogenous due to omitted corporate
culture. It is plausible, for example, that some ﬁrms are more “progressive” than others, so
they have both more incentive-based pay for directors, as well as more female directors.19 All
speciﬁcations include year dummies and, in the speciﬁcations without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, 2-digit
SIC dummies. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and, in the
speciﬁcations without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, group correlation within ﬁrms. Column I of Table 3
18If the fraction is z, our dependent variable is ln( z
1−z +ε),w h e r eε is a very small number we add to ensure
we do not take the logarithm of 0.
19While reverse causality is also a concern, we postpone the discussion of this issue to section 3.4.
16shows the results of an OLS regression. The coeﬃcient on the fraction of women is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcients on the control variables are generally consistent
with expectations. Board independence is positively correlated with the fraction of equity pay.
Volatility is also positively related with equity pay. Although this appears contrary to principal
agent theory, which argues that performance pay should decrease with more uncertainty, it
is not inconsistent with the diﬀering eﬀects of volatility estimated in the literature (see e.g.
Prendergast, 2002).
In column II, we reestimate the speciﬁcation in column I (excluding industry dummies) with
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on diversity is still positive and now signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
This suggests that gender diversity appears to have a positive causal eﬀect on performance pay
for directors. It is perhaps also interesting to note that with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects the eﬀect of
volatility is negative, as predicted by principal agent theory, suggesting that omitted variables
can explain the puzzling result we ﬁnd in column I.
In columns III and IV, we replicate our analysis in columns I and II after replacing the
dependent variable with the natural logarithm of total director compensation. The results from
the OLS speciﬁcation in column III suggests that the fraction of women is negatively related
to total compensation, although the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. However, the coeﬃcient on
gender diversity in the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation in column IV is positive and signiﬁcant at
t h e1 0 %l e v e l .S i n c et h es i g no ft h ec o e ﬃcient on gender diversity changes with ﬁxed eﬀects,
omitted ﬁrm variables appear to be an important source of endogeneity. This suggests that
the true eﬀect of diversity is positive. As we discuss above, it is not clear whether more total
pay for directors is consistent with better governance. However, principal agent theory predicts
that total pay should rise with the amount of performance pay to compensate for risk. Because
gender diversity is positively related to the fraction of equity-based pay, the results for total
pay also seem consistent with theory.
We conclude that there is strong evidence that the proportion of female directors is asso-
ciated with more equity-based pay for directors, which is suggestive of a board that is more
aligned with the interests of shareholders. There is also some weak evidence of higher total
17director compensation in boards with relatively more female directors.
3.3. Board meetings and diversity
To examine the relationship between gender diversity and the number of board meetings, we
use the same speciﬁcation as in Table 3, because we believe similar factors should aﬀect the
number of meetings.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Although the number of meetings is count data, we use OLS to estimate the speciﬁcations
in the ﬁrst 2 columns of Table 4 to facilitate the use of ﬁrm and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Column
I reports OLS estimates. Column II reports ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. In column III, we
reestimate the speciﬁcation in column I using a Poisson regression. All speciﬁcations include
year dummies. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and, in the
speciﬁcations without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, group correlation within ﬁrms.
Consistent with Vafeas (1999), the coeﬃcients on performance, both Tobin’s Q and ROA,
are negative and signiﬁcant which suggests that board meetings serve an important monitoring
function when the ﬁrm is doing poorly.
Across all but the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on gender diversity is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Once we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient remains
positive, but is no longer signiﬁcant. It is plausible that the within-ﬁrm variation in diversity
is not large enough to explain the within-ﬁrm variation in board meetings.
At ﬁrst glance, the economic signiﬁcance of the results seems small. For example, the
estimates in column I suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of female
directors will lead to a 3.24% increase in the number of board meetings. However, the eﬀect
is of a similar magnitude as a one standard deviation increase in board independence, which
would lead to a 3.14% increase in the number of meetings.
183.4. An instrumental variable approach
While we believe that omitted variables are an important reason why diversity may be endoge-
nous in board and director behavior regressions, reverse causality may also be a concern. We
believe reverse causality is less of a concern for attendance behavior and board meetings. It is
hard to imagine that gender diversity will be aﬀe c t e di nas i g n i ﬁcant way by the attendance
behavior of individual directors or the number of board meetings. However, reverse causality
is a concern for the pay regressions because of potential sorting of male and female directors to
ﬁrms based on their preferences for speciﬁc types of pay schedules. In experiments, Dohmen
and Falk (2006) show, for example, that men prefer variable pay schemes more than women
and that this diﬀerence is partly explained by risk preferences. To address this concern, we
need an instrument that is correlated with the fraction of female directors on the board, but
(essentially) uncorrelated with director pay, except through variables we control for. In the
context of governance regressions it is usually diﬃcult to come up with valid instruments, be-
cause the factors that are arguably most correlated with the endogenous variable are other
governance characteristics that are already included in governance regressions, such as board
size, independence, etc. Thus, our approach is to ﬁnd a variable that previous literature has
not yet considered as an explanatory variable in governance regressions.
One reason that is often provided for the absence of women on boards is their lack of
connections. Medland (2004), for example, argues that the most important impediment to
female directorships is that the informal social network linking directors consists primarily of
men. This suggests that the more connected male directors are to women, the more female
directors we should observe. This idea is the basis for our instrument. While we cannot observe
informal social connections between male and female directors, we can observe networks that
occur because directors sit on multiple boards within our sample. If a male director, say
Tom, of company X also sits on the board of company Y which has a female director, Janet,
then Tom is connected to Janet. If connections matter for board appointments, then because
Tom is connected to Janet, company X should be more likely to choose Janet as a director.
19Another reason why company X might be more likely to choose a female director on the basis
of Tom’s connection to Janet is that Tom has experience working with a female director and
may appreciate the value of a women’s perspective. The diversity literature emphasizes that
one cost of increasing diversity is that diverse groups may trust each other less, so that there
is an initial stage in which they must learn to work together (see the discussion in “The Tyson
Report” (Tyson, 2003)). Since Tom already has experience working with a female director,
this start-up cost of increasing diversity may be lower. Finally, Janet may be well-connected to
other women, so company X may be able to use Tom’s connection to Janet to obtain names of
promising female candidates.
If Tom is the only male director of company X connected to a female director, then he may
n o th a v em u c hi n ﬂuence over the choice of a female director. Thus, we deﬁne our instrument
as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there are
female directors.20 We argue that the greater this fraction is, the greater the gender diversity
on the board should be. Thus, this instrument should, at least in theory, satisfy the condition
that it is correlated with the endogenous variable. We test this below. However, to be a
v a l i di n s t r u m e n ti tm u s ts a t i s f yt h es e c o n dc o n d i tion for an instrument, that it is uncorrelated
with director pay except through control variables. One possibility is that the fraction of men
connected to women is correlated with director pay through industry eﬀects. For example,
the fraction of connected men may be higher in certain industries and pay practices may vary
across industries. To address this possibility, we control for both industry eﬀects and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. Another possibility is that our instrument is a proxy for the connectedness of
the board.21 Connectedness may be correlated with pay because it is a proxy for directors’
opportunity cost of time or because connectedness matters per se. If directors’ opportunity cost
20B e c a u s ew eb e l i e v et h a tt h em o r ee x p o s u r em a l ed i r e c t o r s have to female directors the greater the likelihood
of appointing a female director, we do not distinguish unique connections to female directors, i.e. if all male
directors of company X sit on the same board of company Y on which there is a woman, then the fraction of
male directors connected to female directors is 1.
21We have also considered variations of this instrument, such as the fraction of total board seats in other ﬁrms
with female directors. Our results are similar with these measures, but the correlation of our chosen instrument
with gender diversity is much higher, probably because these other measures count female board connections
as well. These may have less of an inﬂuence on gender diversity.
20of time is very high because they sit on many boards, they may have to be incentivized more
through compensation. Although it is not clear why connectedness per se would be correlated
with the fraction of equity pay directors receive, Barnea and Guedj (2006) ﬁnd evidence that
ﬁrms whose boards are more connected award their CEOs more total pay. Thus, it is at least
theoretically possible that director pay is also higher when boards are more connected. To
address these possibilities, we conﬁrm that our results are not sensitive to controlling for both
the total number of external board seats by directors and the total number of male external
board seats in our pay regressions.
It is diﬃcult to come up with other reasons why the fraction of men connected to women
should be correlated with pay. Thus, to the extent that our methods of controlling for the
potential correlation of our instrument with pay are suﬃcient, we believe that our instrument
is valid. However, it is also important to keep in mind that our instrumental variable (IV)
estimates will only capture the eﬀect of increasing gender diversity for those ﬁrms aﬀected by
the instrument, i.e. those ﬁrms for which connections through board memberships inﬂuence
director recruitment. Some ﬁrms may rely more on Human Resource consultants for recruiting
directors; for them, networks will be less important.
(Insert Table 5 about here)
To illustrate the frequency of board connections in the IRRC data, in Table 5 we report
summary statistics for variables related to our instrument at the ﬁrm level, namely the number
of male directors, the number of links between male directors and other boards with female
directors, the fraction of male directors with board connections to female directors (our in-
strument), the sum of all other directorships across board members and the sum of all other
directorships for male directors. On average, 2.6 male directors are connected to a board with
a female director.22 The average percentage of male directors with connections to female di-
rectors is 28.04%. In 3,129 ﬁrm-years, boards have no connections to female directors, but in
108 ﬁrm-years, all male directors are connected to boards with female directors. Given the low
percentage of female directors in our sample, the fraction of boards’ male directors who are
22The board which has 17 men connected to boards with women has 19 directors in all.
21connected to female directors may seem high. However, female directors tend to have more
directorships than male directors which increases the likelihood that male directors are con-
nected to them. In fact, the cumulative frequency of male directors with less than or equal to
a given number of other directorships is always higher than for female directors. For example,
in 89.37% of director-ﬁrm-years male directors have two or fewer other directorships, while the
equivalent number for female directors is 85.54%.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
In Table 6, we analyze the relationship between pay and gender diversity using IV techniques.
We use the same speciﬁcations as in Table 3. Because we use the same set of explanatory
variables for the fraction of equity-based pay and total pay, the ﬁrst stage regressions are the
same for both dependent variables. We report the ﬁrst stage for the IV estimation of the
speciﬁcations in columns I and III of Table 3 (with industry eﬀects) in column I. From the
ﬁrst stage regression, it is evident that our instrument is statistically highly correlated with
gender diversity (at greater than the 1% level of signiﬁcance). The estimates suggest that a
one-standard deviation increase in the fraction of male directors linked to female directors (0.25)
leads to a 12.8% increase in the fraction of women on the board. This is strong evidence for the
hypothesis that director recruiting is highly dependent on the board’s existing connections.23
In column II, we present the IV estimates for the fraction of equity-based pay. These estimates
are consistent with the OLS estimates in column I of Table 3, i.e. the coeﬃcient on diversity
remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. At the bottom of column II,
we report the Hausman test statistic for the hypothesis that the fraction of female directors is
uncorrelated with the error term of the equity-based pay regressions. This statistic is 3.214, thus
we reject the null. However, once we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in column III, we can no longer
reject the null.24 This suggests that although gender diversity appears to be endogenous in the
23It is important to notice that we were careful in the construction of our instrument, so that there is no
mechanical correlation between the instrument and the fraction of female directors. The statistically strong
correlation between the instrument and the variable of interest must then be explained by truly economic
arguments.
24Even after we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the fraction of female directors is highly correlated with our instru-
ment in the ﬁrst stage regression. As is to be expected, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient drops (to 0.015) but it
is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
22fraction of equity-pay regression in column I of Table 3, it is largely because of correlation with
omitted ﬁrm eﬀects. Once we include them, it no longer appears preferable to use IV estimates
(since the Hausman test does not reject the null) than to use OLS as in column II of Table 3.
As the Hausman test statistics at the bottom of columns IV and V suggest, we cannot reject
the null that the fraction of female directors is exogenous in the total pay regressions, thus the
estimates from Table 3 should be more eﬃcient.
Of course, these conclusions depend on the quality of our instrument. To ensure that our
tests are not driven by potential correlation bet w e e no u ri n s t r u m e n ta n dp a yt h r o u g ht h e“ c o n -
nectedness” factor, we replicate our results after separately controlling for total external board
seats by directors and the total number of male external board seats in our pay regressions.
The results are very similar. In the ﬁrst stage regression, the fraction of female directors is
not correlated with total number of board seats but is highly negatively correlated with total
male board seats. However, in both cases the signiﬁcance of the instrument is not aﬀected,
if anything it increases. When we perform our Hausman tests, we cannot reject the null that
diversity is exogenous in the pay regressions, even without ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, our analysis in
this section suggests that although the endogeneity of gender diversity may be a concern in pay
regressions, including ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects appears to solve most of the problem.25
Because we believe that reverse causality is less of a concern for board meetings, we do not
present instrumental variable estimates for board meetings. However, under the assumption
that our instrument is also uncorrelated with the error in the board meeting regression, we
performed a Hausman test of the null that diversity is exogenous. We cannot reject the null. For
example, the Hausman test statistic for the null that diversity is exogenous in the speciﬁcation
in column I of Table 4 (without clustered errors) is 0.764. This conﬁrms that endogeneity due
to reverse causality is not a serious concern for the board meetings regressions.
25O n es h o u l dk e e pi nm i n dt h a tH a u s m a nt e s t sa r en o tt e s ts of the validity of our instrument, but tests of
exogeneity under the maintained assumption that our instrument is valid.
234. Diversity and performance
The results from the previous section suggest that boards with more female directors are char-
acterized by greater participation of directors in decision-making (through attendance and more
meetings) and by more alignment with the interests of shareholders (through equity-based com-
pensation). An interesting question then is whether diversity impacts governance suﬃciently
to aﬀect corporate outcomes and, most importantly, corporate performance. We examine this
issue here.
More incentive alignment and greater participation by directors in decision-making could
have both positive and negative eﬀects on corporate performance. Because boards are seen as
essential to overcoming the agency problem between managers and shareholders, the literature
generally argues that stronger governance should increase shareholder value (see the survey by
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). However, some theoretical papers also argue that too much
board monitoring can decrease shareholder value (e.g. Almazan and Suarez (2003)). Adams
and Ferreira (2007) point out that greater interference by directors in decision-making could
lead to a breakdown in communication between managers and directors. If greater participation
by directors leads to more interference, ﬁrms with diverse boards could perform worse. The
literature on diversity also has ambiguous predictions for the eﬀect of diversity on performance
(see the survey by Milliken and Martins, 1996). Our results suggest that female directors are
not mere tokens, thus they may be able to add value by bringing new ideas and diﬀerent
perspectives to the table. On the other hand, the more dissimilar directors are, the more they
may disagree and the more conﬂict there may be on the board. Thus, it is not necessarily
clear that decision-making improves with greater diversity. Because the predicted eﬀect of
gender diversity on performance is ambiguous, the net eﬀect must ultimately be determined
empirically.
Previous studies argue that gender diversity has a positive eﬀect on proxies for Tobin’s Q
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003) and accounting measures of performance (Erhardt, Werbel
and Shrader, 2003; Catalyst, 2004). The data used in these prior studies were cross-sectional
24and none of these studies fully addressed the fact that gender diversity may be endogenous in
a performance regression.26 Endogeneity may arise because gender diversity is correlated with
omitted ﬁrm speciﬁc variables, such as corporate culture. Firms that are more “progressive”
may have better performances and also more female directors. Diversity may also be endogenous
because past performance may inﬂuence ﬁrms’ choice to select female directors. If female
directors are appointed because of tokenism, for example, then boards may choose female
directors when they believe they can aﬀord to have tokens. On the other hand, Ryan and Haslam
(2005, 2007) argue that women face a “Glass Cliﬀ” in that they are more likely to be appointed
to leadership positions where change is required, e.g. following poor performance. Ryan and
Haslam (2005) ﬁnd evidence that female directors were more likely to be appointed to the
boards of FTSE 100 companies that experienced poor performance in the 5 months preceding
the appointment. Finally, women may use ﬁrm performance as a criterion for accepting a
directorship. All of these arguments suggest that corporate performance will inﬂuence the
proportion of women on the board and highlight the importance of disentangling causality.
As before, we address these endogeneity problems using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental
variable techniques. Because we have little reason to believe that our previous instrument,
the fraction of male directors with board connections to female directors, is correlated with
performance except through variables that we will control for, we continue to use it in our IV
estimation. In addition, we use dynamic panel data estimation techniques to address endo-
g e n e i t yp r o b l e m st h a ta r i s eb e c a u s ep a s tp e r f o r m a n c em a yi n ﬂuence board diversity. If gender
diversity is dynamically inﬂuenced by past performance, then omitting it from our performance
regressions will lead to biased estimates. Simply including past performance in our regression is
not suﬃcient to solve this problem, since past performance will generally be correlated with the
26Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) recognize the problem and address it using 2SLS estimation of a system
in which Tobin’s Q depends on gender diversity and gender diversity depends on Tobin’s Q. The excluded
variables from the diversity equation are board meetings, a dummy indicating that directors receive stock
compensation, inside ownership and ROA. The excluded variables from the Tobin’s Q equation are the average
age of directors and a dummy indicating that a minority director is on the board. Our results from section 3
suggest that the excluded variables from the diversity equation are correlated with the error of the diversity
equation, thus 2SLS estimation of this system will not result in consistent estimates of the eﬀect of gender
diversity.
25error term of our current performance regression. Through the use of ﬁrst diﬀerencing and lags
of exogenous variables as instruments, Arellano-Bond estimation techniques provide consistent
estimates even when we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
We begin our analysis by attempting to replicate the positive correlation between diversity
and performance documented in previous literature. As in this literature, we use two measures
of performance, Tobin’s Q and ROA. We estimate a simple model of performance which includes
the fraction of women on the board, board size and independence, log(sales), the number of
business segments, year dummies and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. We correct the standard
errors for group correlation within ﬁrms and heteroskedasticity. The results for Tobin’s Q
are in column I of Table 7. Consistent with the positive relation between gender diversity
and performance documented in previous studies, the coeﬃcient on diversity is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Next we try to address the endogeneity of diversity by adding ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in column
I I .O n c ew ea d dﬁrm eﬀects the coeﬃcient on diversity remains statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level, but the sign is now negative. This suggests that the positive correlation between
diversity and performance in column I is driven by omitted ﬁrm speciﬁc factors. To address
the fact that diversity could still be endogenous in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation due to reverse
causality, we reestimate the speciﬁcation in column II using IV techniques. The ﬁrst stage
is reported in column III, the second stage in column IV. The results from column IV are
consistent with those in column II, i.e. the coeﬃcient on diversity remains negative and is
now signiﬁcant at the 5% level.27 In column V, we present the outcome of one-step Arellano-
Bond estimates of the speciﬁcation in column II augmented by one-period lagged Tobin’s Q.28
The coeﬃcient on diversity is no longer signiﬁcant in column V, however it is still negative.
The conclusion we draw from Table 7 is that the positive correlation between performance
27Our results remain robust to controlling for the total number of external board seats of directors and the
total number of male external board seats, i.e. the coeﬃcient on diversity is always negative and signiﬁcant in
the second stage.
28In this speciﬁcation we use two and all further period lagged Tobin’s Q and one period lags of all right hand
side variables except for year dummies as instruments. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
26and diversity documented in prior literature is not robust to any method of addressing the
endogeneity of diversity. If anything, the relationship appears to be negative.29
(Insert Table 8 about here)
In Table 8, we replicate the analysis in Table 7 for ROA. As for Tobin’s Q, we conﬁrm
the positive relationship between gender diversity and ROA in OLS regressions with industry
controls (column I). As for Tobin’s Q, this relationship is not robust to any method of addressing
the endogeneity of diversity. Instead, the coeﬃcient on diversity is negative and signiﬁcant
in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and IV speciﬁcations and is negative, although not signiﬁcant in the
Arellano-Bond speciﬁcation.30
At ﬁrst glance these results appear surprising in light of the fact that the previous section
suggests that more diverse boards have stronger governance. The results suggest that on average
tough boards do not improve ﬁrm value. However, they do not imply that tough boards never
add value. Although the governance literature often argues that boards that monitor more
strongly should have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value, ex ante we do not believe we should expect
tough boards to add value in all ﬁrms. Instead, the value of a tough board should depend
on the strength of the ﬁrms’ other governance mechanisms. If ﬁr m sh a v eo t h e r w i s es t r o n g
governance, having a tough board may lead to overmonitoring. But if ﬁrms have otherwise
weak governance, we would expect tough boards to be particularly valuable.
To examine this hypothesis, we use Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) governance index,
which we call Gindex, as a proxy for the strength of ﬁrms’ governance mechanisms other than
the measures of board governance we examine above. Gindex is the sum of 24 dummy variables
each of which measures whether a ﬁrm has a particular charter provision, bylaw provision or
state of incorporation law that makes it more diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to be taken over. A higher
value of Gindex indicates a ﬁrm that is more insulated from takeovers and one in which, ceteris
29Although not the main focus of their paper, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of diversity
on performance for Norway.
30As for Tobin’s Q, our results remain robust to controlling for the total number of external board seats of
directors and the total number of male external board seats. For example, if we control for the total number of
male external board seats, the coeﬃcient on diversity in the second stage is -76.926 and is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
27paribus, one might expect agency problems to be higher. From our perspective, the beneﬁt
of using Gindex as a measure of governance is that it measures a completely diﬀerent set of
governance mechanisms than the ones we examine above. The average value of Gindex in our
sample is 9.177, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 19.
(Insert Table 9 about here)
In Table 9, we rerun our performance regressions after including two new variables: Gindex
a n dt h ep r o d u c to fG i n d e xa n dt h ef r a c t i o no ff e m a l ed i r e c t o r s .W er e p o r tb o t hﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
regressions as well as Arellano-Bond one-step estimates. We omit IV estimates because we do
not have an instument for Gindex. Although Gindex is usually taken as exogenous (Gompers et
al., 2003), there are also arguments for its enodgeneity. In columns I and II, we ﬁrst report ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀect estimates for Tobin’s Q and ROA regressions that include Gindex. Consistent with
the idea that Gindex is a measure of agency costs, the coeﬃcient on Gindex is negative and
signiﬁcant in both columns. In columns III and IV, we include the interaction between Gindex
and diversity. In these regressions, the coeﬃcient on Gindex is still negative, the coeﬃcient on
diversity is negative, but the coeﬃcient on the interaction is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. This suggests that diverse boards add value in ﬁrms with otherwise weak governance,
consistent with our hypothesis. In columns V and VI, we replicate this analysis using Arellano-
Bond estimates. The results in column V are consistent with those in columns III and IV. The
results for ROA in column VI provide no additional information since no variable is signiﬁcant.
Our interpretation of the results is that diverse boards appear to be tougher monitors. Con-
sistent with the idea that overmonitoring may decrease value, diversity does not add value on
average. However, diverse boards appear to be particularly valuable for ﬁrms with otherwise
weak governance. More generally, the results highlight the importance of addressing the po-
tential endogeneity of diversity. If we do nothing to address the endogeneity of diversity we
ﬁnd that diversity has a positive correlation with performance. However, this is clearly not a
robust result. While the idea that women improve performance may be more appealing, it is
not a result that should be the basis of policy or business practice as it currently sometimes
28is.31 Instead, it is our belief that if ﬁrms simply add women to a board and expect them to au-
tomatically improve performance, they do women more of a disservice than if ﬁrms deliberately
choose women where they can add value.
5. Diﬀerences in characteristics between female and male
directors
The theory of tokenism (Kanter, 1977) suggests that if female directors are chosen to be tokens,
they will have little impact on board processes. In this case, we should ﬁnd little relationship
between board characteristics and gender diversity. In contrast, as we show above, gender
diversity seems to have a signiﬁcant impact on board characteristics and performance. A natural
question is what drives this relationship. It is possible that it is not gender diversity per se
that drives it but the fact that the population of female directors happens to be substantially
diﬀerent from the population of male directors in terms of age and tenure, for example, for
reasons uncorrelated with gender preferences. We do not believe the explanation is so simple,
because in our comparison of female and male attendance behavior we control for a variety
of directors characteristics and female directors still appear to behave diﬀerently than male
directors. We also believe that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd characteristics that will be uncorrelated with
gender preferences.32 For example, many argue that female directors may be less experienced
than male directors. But experience can also be driven by sorting of women into speciﬁc
types of professions, i.e. by gender preferences. Nevertheless, in this section we perform some
robustness checks to ensure that our results are not driven by simple diﬀerences in observable
characteristics other than gender.
(Insert Table 10 about here)
31For example, an article in Australia’s Financial Review Magazine (Turner, 2007) describes one reason why
a chief executive of Deloitte believes there is a business case for employing women as follows: “Swiegers was
mindful, too, of a 2001 US study of Fortune 500 companies, which found that those with a high number of
w o m e ne x e c u t i v e so u t p e r f o r m e dm e d i a nc o m p e t i t o r si ntheir industry, and that companies that scored best in
terms of promoting women were consistently more proﬁtable.”
32This is a fundamental problem in all diversity literature (see e.g. Milliken and Martins, 1996).
29In Table 10, we compare observable characteristics of female directors to those of male
directors. Female directors have more directorships, lower director tenure, they are younger and
are less likely to be retired from their main occupation than male directors. These diﬀerences are
all statistically signiﬁcant, but their magnitudes are not so dramatic that one would immediately
conclude that female directors are substantially diﬀerent from male directors. For example,
while female directors are younger, the average age of female directors is 54.761 as opposed to
59.405 for male directors. Of course, such diﬀerences may still matter suﬃciently to aﬀect our
results.
We begin our analysis by reexamining director attendance behavior. Although we show that
female director attendance behavior is robust to individual level controls, it is possible that the
spillover eﬀect of diversity on male attendance behavior we document in section 3.1 is not driven
by the fact that the behavior of female directors inﬂuences that of male directors but by the fact
that male directors’ attendance is a function of certain characteristics of female directors. For
example, if female directors are less experienced than male directors, as measured, for example,
by age and tenure, then male directors may feel more of a need to be present in board meetings.
To examine whether male attendance behavior is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of women
rather than by a gender-speciﬁci n ﬂuence, we restrict our director level sample to male directors
in ﬁrms with women on the board. This restriction reduces our sample to 37,354 directorship
observations. We then estimate the same probit model as in column II of Table 3 augmented by
the average number of external board seats, the average tenure, the average age and the average
retirement status of female directors. For the sake of brevity, we report only the coeﬃcients on
diversity and the average female characteristics below:






Average # Other directorships of female directors
+0.004
[1.10]
Average tenure of female directors
−0.007
∗∗ Average age of female directors
+0.007
[0.11]
Average retirement status of female directors
+control variables + error term
None of the characteristics except for the average age of female directors has a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the attendance behavior of male directors. In contrast to what one might have ex-
pected, the coeﬃcient on the average age is negative, i.e. male directors are less likely to have
attendance problems the older the female directors are. Since older female directors are plausi-
bly more experienced than younger ones, this suggests that male directors do not show up more
to compensate for the lack of experience of female directors. In addition, the estimates suggest
that even after controlling for average observable characteristics of female directors, male di-
rectors will be signiﬁcantly less likely to have attendance problems the greater the fraction of
female directors. Thus, our attendance results are not simply caused by the fact that female
directors diﬀer in observable characteristics.
(Insert Table 11 about here)
To examine whether our other results are driven by director characteristics other than
gender, we examine whether our results for gender diversity are robust to controlling for the
average number of external board seats, the average tenure, the average age and the average
retirement status of all directors on the board. In essence, we are asking whether gender matters
once these characteristics are held ﬁx e da tt h eb o a r dl e v e l .F o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,i nT a b l e1 1
we report only the results of augmenting the ﬁxed eﬀect models in columns II and IV of Table
3, column IV of Table 4 and column II of Tables 7 and 8 with these board characteristics. For
31the number of board meetings, we also report OLS regression with industry dummies, but no
ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 11 suggests that our results are not driven by the fact that the average
characteristics of the board change with an increase in female directors. The coeﬃcients on
the fraction of female directors remain statistically signiﬁcant in all but the ROA regression in
column VI. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients remain roughly similar. While they
decrease for all but Tobin’s Q, the magnitudes of the decreases are small. For example, the
coeﬃcient drops from 4.960 (0.372) to 4.874 (0.384) in the fraction of equity pay (total pay)
regression.
6. Final Remarks
The gender diversity of the board is a central theme of many recent governance reform eﬀorts.
However, the consequences of changing the gender diversity of the board are, as yet, little
understood. While a large literature documents that women behave diﬀerently in a variety of
settings, ex ante it is not clear whether we should also expect women to behave diﬀerently than
men in the boardroom. In this paper, we provide some new evidence that female directors
behave diﬀerently than male directors, even after controlling for observable characteristics. We
also ﬁnd that the gender composition of the board is positively related to measures of board
eﬀectiveness. Female directors appear to have a similar impact as the independent directors
described in governance theory do.
Our results highlight the importance of trying to address the endogeneity of diversity in
performance regressions. Although a positive relationship between diversity and performance
is often cited in the popular press, it is not robust to any of our methods of addressing the
endogeneity of diversity. The true relationship between diversity and performance appears to
be more complex. We ﬁnd that diversity has a positive impact on performance in ﬁrms that
otherwise have weak governance, as measured by its ability to resist takeovers. In ﬁrms with
strong governance, however, enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom may ultimately decrease
shareholder value. One possibility is that greater diversity may lead to overmonitoring in those
32ﬁrms.
More generally, our results show that, although they may have been selected because of
tokenism, female directors have a substantial and value-relevant impact on board structure.
Thus, director demography appears to be an important element of governance.
7. Appendix A: Data cleaning
The IRRC data we use to construct our sample has various data issues concerning director
characteristics which we address.
Age In some cases, directors were listed as being younger than 20. We eliminated these
observations.
Tenure The IRRC data contains a variable which indicates the year a director was ﬁrst
appointed to the board. In some cases, there are multiple entries for a director at a given ﬁrm.
We take the minimum value of these as a measure of the year a director was ﬁrst appointed
to the board. Our proxy for a director’s tenure on the board is the diﬀerence between the
current year and the year he began service. In cases where no beginning date was available for
the director, we deﬁne tenure to be missing. In cases in which the director’s departure date is
less than his beginning date, tenure is negative, or tenure is greater than the director’s age, we
deﬁne tenure to be missing.
Retired To determine whether a director is retired, we use data on directors’ titles available in
the IRRC data. We classify a director as retired if his title contains the word “retired”. We also
classify a director as retired if data on his primary employer contained the word “retired”.We
are careful to account for changes in spelling. To account for missing information on a director’s
retirement status, we also classify directors over the age of 70 as being retired.
33Gender The IRRC data contains a variable called gender, however this data is quite incom-
plete and sometimes inconsistent for the same director. To complete it, we use a director’s
ﬁrst name to determine whether a director is male or female. In cases in which the name was
diﬃcult to classify, we used the internet to try and determine the director’s gender. If this
was not possible, we classiﬁed gender as missing. We also ensured that a director’s gender was
classiﬁed consistently across his directorships.
Number of Other Directorships The IRRC data contains data from company proxy state-
ments on the number of other directorships a director has. We cross-checked this data using
the number of other directorships directors hold within the sample. In cases in which the IRRC
measure was less than the within-sample measure, we set the number of other directorships
equal to the within-sample measure. In all other cases, we retained the IRRC measure.
8. Appendix B: Equity-based compensation data
To construct measures of director compensation, we need to estimate the value of the shares and
options granted to directors. These shares and options almost always come with restrictions.
Although restrictions vary across ﬁrms, a typical restriction is that directors cannot sell their
shares until they leave the ﬁrm. Options usually come with vesting requirements and they may
or may not be exercisable if the director leaves the ﬁrm. Although restricted shares should not
have the same value as ordinary shares and options with diﬀerent vesting requirements should
be valued diﬀerently, restrictions vary too much across ﬁrms to justify any simple adjustment
procedure. Thus, we follow the conventional practice (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal
and Samwick; 1999) and ignore all restrictions and vesting requirements and assume that options
and shares are priced as if they had no restrictions.33
We choose to value director options using a procedure that is as close as possible to Ex-
33Hall and Murphy (2002) show how undiversiﬁed executives will value their stock options and restricted shares
less than the value implied by usual option-pricing formulas (such as Black-Scholes). Thus, one should keep in
mind that the estimates of director’s compensation are biased upwards, or that they can be best interpreted as
an upper bound on actual compensation.
34ecuComp’s procedure for valuing options for the top 5 executives in each ﬁrm. To price the
options we use the Black-Scholes formula, assuming continuously paid dividends. Estimates of
ﬁrm volatility, dividend-yield and the risk-free rate are from ExecuComp. Expiration of director
options usually occurs in ten years; we use seven years to be consistent with ExecuComp.
In most ﬁrms, the exercise price of an option is the stock price on the date of the grant.
Since directors are generally elected at the annual meeting of the shareholders, the majority of
ﬁrms grant directors shares and options at the annual meetings. Thus, we use the market price
of shares at the end of the month of each ﬁrm’s annual meeting at the beginning of the ﬁscal
year as the exercise price of the options as well as the price of the stock granted during that
year.
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40Table 1A: Summary statistics  
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 86,714 director level observations from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-
2003 which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. The 
IRRC Director data consists of director level data for S&P 500, S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap firms. Data on board 
meetings, director compensation and most financial data are from ExecuComp. We obtain additional financial 
information (e.g. SIC codes, business segment data and stock returns) from Compustat and CRSP. Tobin’s Q is the ratio 
of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets-book equity+market value of equity. 
ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by book assets. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of previous 60 month stock returns. IRRC Institutional ownership data is only available from 1999-
2001. The IRRC classifies directors as independent if they have no business relationship with the firm, are not related or 
interlocked with management and are not current or former employees. Total Director Compensation is the sum of the 
annual retainer, # Board Meetings times Board Meeting Fee and the value of all stock-based compensation. Options 
were priced following the method in ExecuComp. We used the stock price at the end of the month of the firm’s annual 
meeting for the exercise price of the options, as well as to value stock grants. All compensation numbers have been 
converted to 2003 dollars using the CPI-U. Firm has Female Director is a dummy variable which is one if the firm has 
female directors in a given year. Firm has Only One Female Director is a dummy variable which is one if the firm only 
has one female director. Attendance Problem is a dummy variable which is equal to one in a given fiscal year if a firm 
disclosed in its proxy statement that a director attended fewer than 75% of the meetings he was supposed to during that 
year. Tenure is equal to the number of years the director has served on the board. Retired Dummy is equal to 1 if the 
proxy indicated that the director retired from his primary occupation.  
  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Firm Characteristics 
Sales  (millions)  8253 4348.442 9955.245  0.317  168919 
Log(Sales)  8253 7.262475 1.490205 -1.14885 12.03717 
# Business Segments  8253  5.907549  4.976611  1  32 
Tobin’s  Q  8253 2.093564 2.073427 0.475928 77.63474 
ROA  8253 3.195339 16.38234  -577.85  59.59 
Volatility  8253 0.423223 0.199925  0.102  1.899 
Board Characteristics 
Board  Size  8253 9.376227 2.675104  3  39 
Fraction Independent 
Directors 
8253 0.62989 0.18134  0  0.9375 
# Female Outside Directors  8253  0.802254  0.821671  0  4 
# Female Inside Directors  8246  0.04863  0.230879  0  3 
Firm has Female Directors  8253  0.606567  0.488541  0  1 
Firm has Only One Female 
Director 
8253 0.399249 0.489774  0  1 
Fraction Female Directors  8253  0.084518  0.082898  0  0.5 
# Board Meetings  8253  7.172543  3.067631  1  36 
Total Director Compensation 
(thousands) 
8253 95.86699 198.9675 9.54E-07 7972.834 
Fraction Equity Pay  8253  0.395027  0.358797  0  1 
Meeting Fee (thousands)  8253  1.029881  0.847074  0  7.7 
Director Characteristics 
Female Dummy  86714  .0932721    .2908151  0  1 
Attendance  Problem  86714 0.023825 0.152506  0  1 
# Other Directorships  86714  0.921708  1.306012  0  10 
Tenure  86714 9.726861 8.143287  0  63 
Age  86714 58.97163 8.643765  25  98 
Retired  Dummy 86714  0.18365  0.387201 0 1 Table 1B: Representation of female directors across industry 
 
This table shows firm-level averages of variables describing the representation of female directors in each 2-digit SIC code. 
The sample is the intersection of the full IRRC data and Compustat SIC codes. Column II shows the fraction of female 
directors on boards. Column III shows the fraction of firm years in which firms had at least one female director. Column IV 
shows the fraction of firm years in which firms had only one female director on board. The table is sorted by column II in 
ascending order. The table continues on the next page. 
 
2-digit SIC code  Obs.  Fraction female 
directors 
At least one female 
director dummy 
Only one female 
director dummy 
17-Special Trade Contractors  11  0.02  0.18  0.18 
13-Oil and Gas Extraction  292  0.04  0.31  0.24 
47-Transportation  Services  36  0.04 0.31 0.31 
44-Water  Transportation  46  0.04 0.37 0.28 
36-Electronic & Other Equipment  794  0.05  0.36  0.27 
15-General Building Contractors  75  0.05  0.40  0.33 
42-Trucking And Warehousing  83  0.05  0.42  0.31 
10-Metal  Mining  59  0.05 0.53 0.46 
64-Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service  59  0.06  0.54  0.37 
24-Lumber And Wood Products  81  0.06  0.47  0.43 
37-Transportation  Equipment  341  0.06 0.53 0.39 
50-Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods  225  0.06  0.52  0.43 
35-Industrial Machinery And Equipment  688  0.06  0.48  0.36 
32-Stone, Clay, And Glass Products  70  0.06  0.46  0.31 
87-Engineering & Management Services  88  0.06  0.55  0.43 
34-Fabricated  Metal  Products  179  0.07 0.52 0.36 
33-Primary Metal Industries  222  0.07  0.54  0.44 
40-Railroad  Transportation  50  0.07 0.68 0.64 
14-Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels  23  0.07  0.74  0.74 
1-Agricultural  production-Crops 19  0.07 0.53 0.37 
73-Business  Services  868  0.07 0.46 0.36 
62-Security And Commodity Brokers  133  0.07  0.62  0.41 
70-Hotels And Other Lodging Places  32  0.07 0.59 0.34 
78-Motion  Pictures  28  0.07 0.61 0.36 
38-Instruments And Related Products  490  0.07  0.53  0.38 
55-Automotive Dealers And Service Stations  48  0.08  0.58  0.44 
61-Nondepository  Institutions  96  0.08 0.58 0.30 
25-Furniture and Fixtures  78  0.08  0.62  0.53 
72-Personal  Services  55  0.08 0.62 0.55 
26-Paper And Allied Products  203  0.08  0.66  0.45 
58-Eating And Drinking Places  169  0.09  0.60  0.40 
79-Amusement And Recreation Services  60  0.09  0.58  0.42 
39-Misc.  Manufacturing  Industries  84  0.09 0.58 0.31 
67-Holding And Other Investment Offices  53  0.09  0.64  0.47 
75-Auto Repair, Services, And Parking  21  0.09  0.62  0.33 
22-Textile Mill Products  93  0.09  0.56  0.30 
82-Educational  Services  20  0.09 0.75 0.55 
60-Depository  Institutions  627  0.09 0.80 0.44 
45-Transportation  By  Air  93  0.09 0.68 0.42 
63-Insurance  Carriers  431  0.09 0.70 0.39 
99-Nonclassifiable  Establishments  30  0.10 0.70 0.30 
57-Furniture And Home furnishings Stores  58  0.10  0.64  0.50 Table 1B (continued): Representation of female directors across industry  
 
 
2-digit SIC code  Obs.  Fraction female 
directors 
At least one female 
director dummy 
Only one female 
director dummy 
28-Chemicals And Allied Products  766 0.10  0.68  0.41 
51-Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods  124  0.10  0.66  0.35 
80-Health Services  135  0.10  0.67  0.44 
48-Communication 207  0.10  0.76  0.47 
30-Rubber And Misc. Plastics Products  103  0.10  0.76  0.51 
53-General Merchandise Stores  133  0.10  0.74  0.32 
52-Eating And Drinking Places  28  0.11  0.71  0.25 
29-Petroleum And Coal Products  114  0.12  0.89  0.46 
83-Social Services  6  0.12  1.00  0.00 
49-Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services  729  0.12  0.87  0.53 
16-Heavy Construction, Except Building  47  0.12  0.81  0.36 
20-Food And Kindred Products  297  0.12  0.81  0.38 
23-Apparel And Other Textile Products  111  0.13  0.71  0.45 
12-Coal Mining  11  0.13  0.82  0.27 
7-Agricultural Services  2  0.13  1.00  0.00 
59-Miscellaneous Retail  194  0.14  0.79  0.49 
41-Local And Interurban Passenger 
Transit 
3 0.14  1.00  1.00 
27-Printing And Publishing  218  0.14  0.85  0.35 
31-Leather and Leather products  40  0.14  0.75  0.25 
21-Tobacco Products  9  0.15  0.89  0.56 
56-Apparel and Accessory Stores 164  0.15 0.84 0.45 
54-Food Stores  76  0.15  0.88  0.32 
65-Real Estate  6  0.16  1.00  0.33 
 Table 1C: Comparisons of firms with female directors to those without  
 
This table shows comparisons of means of firm-level characteristics for firms with female directors to 
firms without for the sample of complete data resulting from the intersection of the IRRC Director 
data, ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP. The number of observations is 8,253. Tobin’s Q is the ratio 
of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets-book equity+market 
value of equity. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
book assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of previous 60 month stock returns. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Firm Characteristics  Mean for firms 
with 
female directors 




Log(Sales) 7.778  6.469  1.309*** 
# Business Segments  6.583  4.868  1.715*** 
Tobin’s Q  2.028  2.193  -0.165*** 
ROA 4.517  1.157  3.36*** 
Volatility 0.374  0.5  -0.126*** Table 2: Relationship between attendance problems of directors and gender diversity in director level data  
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 which were both in the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. We exclude inside directors from the sample, as well as all 
directors in a given fiscal year who were appointed that year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
director was named in the proxy as having attended fewer than 75% of the meetings he was supposed to attend during the previous 
fiscal year. Compensation measures are quoted in 2003 dollars. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1A. Columns I-II 
contain probit regressions; columns III-IV show linear probability models. The specifications in column I-II include 2-digit SIC 
industry dummies. The specifications in columns III-IV include firm fixed effects. The sample is restricted to male directors in 
columns II and IV. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and for group 
correlation at the directorship (director-firm) level in regressions without firm fixed effects. Absolute values of robust z-statistics are in 
brackets. Marginal effects for the female dummy and the fraction of women on the board are reported in parentheses in the probit 
regressions. The effect of the constant term is omitted. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. The 
number of observations varies because of perfect predictability of the dependent variable. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Attendance Problem 
 I  II  III  IV 
Female  Dummy  -0.116*** . -0.007*** . 
   (-0.007) 
[3.00] 
. [3.04] . 
Fraction Female Directors  .  -0.417**  .  -0.035* 
 .  (-0.026)   
[2.12] 
. [1.71] 
Meeting Fee  -0.043***  -0.045***  -0.001  -1.25e-4 
 [2.66]  [2.64]  [0.34]  [0.07] 
# Other Directorships  0.055***  0.061***  0.004***  0.005*** 
 [6.00]  [6.14]  [6.59]  [6.69] 
Total Compensation (Excl. Meet. Fees)  -1.046e-4  -6.36e-5  -0.000**  -0.000* 
 [1.38]  [0.88]  [2.26]  [1.89] 
# Board Meetings  -0.020***  -0.018***  3.03e-4  0.001 
 [4.63]  [3.90]  [1.01]  [1.56] 
Board Size  0.036***  0.037***  0.002***  0.002** 
 [7.07]  [6.87]  [2.69]  [2.35] 
Fraction Independent Directors  -0.189**  -0.202**  0.020**  0.021** 
 [2.42]  [2.44]  [2.31]  [2.29] 
Tenure -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 [3.80]  [3.56]  [5.04]  [4.67] 
Age -0.002  -0.002  -1.724e-4  -1.574e-4 
 [1.11]  [0.73]  [1.52]  [1.27] 
Retired Dummy  -0.129***  -0.132***  -0.006***  -0.006*** 
 [3.87]  [3.79]  [3.44]  [3.17] 
Log(Sales) -0.043***  -0.037***  -0.003  -0.003 
 [3.80]  [3.02]  [1.04]  [1.04] 
Tobin’s Q  -0.009  -0.014  -3.643e4  -0.001 
 [1.20]  [1.53]  [0.79]  [1.59] 
ROA 1.255e-4  4.621e-4  4.04e-6  4.73e-5 
 [0.14]  [0.48]  [0.05]  [0.60] 
Volatility 0.138  0.118  -0.005  -0.006 
 [1.39]  [1.13]  [0.42]  [0.46] 
Observations  63998 56951 65480 58302 
R-squared .  .  0.069  0.075 
Sample  type  Full Men  only Full Men  only 
Industry  effects  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Firm fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes Table 3: OLS and firm fixed effect regressions of measures of director pay on gender diversity 
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 which were both in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Fraction Equity-based Pay is the ratio of the 
value of equity pay to total compensation each director receives in a year. Total Director Compensation is calculated as the sum 
of the annual retainer, # Board Meetings times Board Meeting Fee and the value of all stock-based compensation. Remaining 
sample characteristics are as in Table 1A. The dependent variable in columns I and II is log((Fraction Equity-based Pay/(1-
Fraction Equity-based Pay))+ε), where ε is a very small number. The dependent variable in columns III and IV is Ln(Total 
Director Compensation). The specifications in column I and III include 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The specifications in 
column II and IV include firm fixed effects. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity and for group correlation at the firm level in regressions without firm fixed effects. Absolute values of robust 
t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.  
 
 
  Dependent Variable: Logtransform(Fraction 
Equity-based pay) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Total 
Director Compensation) 
 I  II  III  IV 
Fraction Female Directors  4.536**  4.960***  -0.124 0.372* 
 [2.52]  [3.37]  [0.55] [1.89] 
Board Size  -0.150**  -0.112**  -0.031*** -0.007 
 [2.26]  [2.34]  [3.51] [1.11] 
Fraction Independent Directors  5.155***  0.328  0.329*** 0.007 
 [5.83]  [0.50]  [2.73] [0.08] 
Log(Sales) 0.827***  0.741***  0.192*** 0.350*** 
 [6.28]  [3.40]  [11.25] [10.89] 
# Business Segments  0.014  0.047**  -0.003 -0.006** 
 [0.41]  [2.27]  [0.73] [2.43] 
Tobin’s Q  0.341***  0.095**  0.072*** 0.024*** 
 [4.04]  [1.97]  [6.08] [3.41] 
ROA -0.004  0.004  0.001 0.003*** 
 [0.63]  [1.16]  [1.31] [3.35] 
Volatility 9.575***  -2.635***  1.744*** -0.298** 
 [9.56]  [3.08]  [11.67] [2.43] 
Constant -21.506***  -10.959***  1.427*** 1.173*** 
 [6.49]  [6.56]  [6.13] [4.75] 
Observations 7856  7983  8123 8253 
R-squared 0.165  0.791  0.276 0.807 
Industry dummies  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Firm fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
  Table 4: OLS, firm fixed effect and Poisson regressions of board meetings on gender diversity 
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 
which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. The 
dependent variable in all columns is the number of board meetings in a given year. Remaining sample 
characteristics are as in Table 1A. The specifications in column I and III include 2-digit SIC industry dummies. 
The specifications in columns I-II are estimated using OLS, the specification in column III is estimated using a 
poisson regression. The specification in column II includes firm fixed effects. All specifications include year 
dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and for group correlation at the firm 
level in regressions without firm fixed effects. Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks 
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.  
 
  Dependent Variable: # Board Meetings 
 I  II  III 
Fraction Female Directors  2.808*** 0.774 0.394*** 
  [4.13] [0.97] [4.32] 
Board Size  -0.017 -0.025 -0.002 
  [0.73] [0.95] [0.57] 
Fraction Independent Directors  1.252*** -0.727** 0.185*** 
  [4.38] [2.16] [4.53] 
Log(Sales)  0.471*** 0.400*** 0.063*** 
  [10.23] [2.98] [10.43] 
# Business Segments  0.026** -0.014 0.004** 
  [1.96] [1.19] [2.03] 
Tobin’s Q  -0.057*** -0.014 -0.009*** 
  [2.89] [0.64] [2.92] 
ROA  -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.002*** 
  [5.13] [3.67] [5.52] 
Volatility  4.029*** 3.581*** 0.557*** 
  [9.96] [5.42]  [11.03] 
Constant  5.525 3.572***  1.652*** 
  [1.62] [3.55] [4.88] 
Observations  8176 8318 8176 
R-squared  0.168 0.621  . 
Industry  dummies  Yes No Yes 




 Table 5: Summary statistics for variables related to the fraction of male directors with board 
connections to female directors  
 
This table shows firm level averages of variables related to board connections from 1996-2003 in the 
complete IRRC data (13,087 observations). Number Males with Board Connections to Female Directors is 
the number of male directors on a board who sit on other boards with female directors. Fraction Males with 
Board Connections to Female Directors is Number Males Linked to Females Directors divided by the 
Number of Male Directors. The Sum of All Other Directorships is the sum of all external directorships 
across all board members. The Sum of All Other Male Directorships is the sum of all external directorships 
across all male board members.  
 
  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Number of Male Directors  8.748  2.767  1  37 
Number Males with Board 
Connections to Female Directors 
2.608 2.631  0  17 
Fraction Males with Board 
Connections to Female Directors 
0.280 0.251  0  1 
Sum of All Other Directorships  6.567  7.035  0  50 
Sum of All Other Male 
Directorships 





 Table 6: IV regressions of measures of director pay on gender diversity 
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 which were both in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Fraction Equity-based Pay is the ratio of the 
value of equity pay to total compensation each director receives in a year. Total Director Compensation is calculated as the sum of 
the annual retainer, # Board Meetings times Board Meeting Fee and the value of all stock-based compensation. Remaining sample 
characteristics are as in Table 1A. The dependent variable in columns II and III is log((Fraction Equity-based Pay/(1-Fraction 
Equity-based Pay))+ε), where ε is a very small number. The specifications in columns III and V include firm fixed effects. The 
specifications in columns I, II and IV include 2-digit SIC dummies. Column I reports the first stage of an IV regression with 
Fraction Males with Board Connections to Female Directors as an instrument for Fraction Female Directors. Columns II-V report 
the results of the IV estimation with Logtransform(Fraction Equity-based pay) and Ln(Total Director Compensation) as 
dependent variables. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity in 
columns I, II and IV. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 











Dependent Variable: Ln(Total 
Director Compensation) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
Fraction Female Directors  .  35.376*** -7.627  0.443  8.725* 
 .  [3.67] [0.24] [0.38] [1.71] 
Board Size  0.003***  -0.245*** -0.111** -0.033***  -0.008 
 [6.91]  [4.92] [2.57] [4.98] [1.19] 
Fraction Independent Directors  0.071***  2.454** 1.029 0.280** -0.446 
 [13.91]  [2.47] [0.55] [2.08] [1.54] 
Log(Sales) 0.008***  0.458*** 0.762*** 0.186*** 0.328*** 
 [10.25]  [3.31] [4.16]  [11.00]  [10.60] 
# Business Segments  2.097e-4  0.006 0.050** -0.003  -0.008** 
 [0.96]  [0.26] [2.41] [1.29] [2.46] 
Tobin’s Q  0.002***  0.278*** 0.095** 0.071***  0.023*** 
 [3.77]  [4.25] [1.99] [6.37] [4.32] 
ROA 2.54e-5  -0.004 0.004 0.001  0.004*** 
 [0.41]  [0.62] [0.73] [1.51] [4.62] 
Volatility -0.032***  10.711*** -2.788***  1.764***  -0.192 
 [5.24]  [14.63] [3.47] [17.68] [1.49] 
Fraction Males with Board 




. . . . 
       
Constant -0.061***  -18.683*** -10.605***  1.478***  1.001*** 
 [3.09]  [8.57] [6.53] [7.31] [4.21] 
Observations 7856  7856 7983 8123 8253 
R-squared 0.268  0.073 . 0.274 . 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Hausman test statistic  .  3.214  -0.395  0.487  1.636 
 Table 7: Performance: Ln(Tobin’s Q) and gender diversity   
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 which 
were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets-book equity+market value of 
equity. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1A. The dependent variable in columns I-II and IV-V is the 
natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. The specification in column I includes 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The 
specifications in columns II-IV include firm fixed effects. Column III reports the first stage of an IV regression with 
Fraction Males with Board Connections to Female Directors as an instrument for Fraction Female Directors. 
Column IV reports the results of the IV estimation. Column V reports the results of an Arellano-Bond one step 
regression. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity in 
columns I, II and V.  Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in column I. Absolute values 











Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
Fraction Female Directors  0.221*  -0.135*  .  -5.924**  -1.895 
 [1.72]  [1.67] .  [2.21]  [0.56] 
Board Size  -0.012***  -0.012***  3.593e-4  -0.010**  -0.103 
 [2.81]  [4.14]  [0.89]  [2.56]  [0.89] 
Fraction Independent 
Directors 
-0.131** 0.04 0.051*** 0.342** 
-3.471** 
 [2.29]  [1.11]  [9.89]  [2.32]  [2.20] 
Log(Sales) 0.031***  -0.002  0.002  0.011  -0.553** 
 [3.11]  [0.17]  [1.20]  [0.72]  [1.96] 
# Business Segments  -0.016***  -0.003**  6.34e-5  -0.003*  0.098*** 
 [7.05]  [2.54]  [0.35]  [1.67]  [2.91] 
Fraction Males with Board 












          
Lagged Ln(Tobin’s Q)  .  .  .  .  0.480*** 
 .  .  .  .  [5.50] 
Constant 0.886***  0.707***  0.017  0.808***  -0.127** 
 [3.53]  [8.91]  [1.50]  [7.13]  [2.02] 
Observations 9299  9477  9477  9477  5588 
R-squared 0.254  0.105  0.08  .  . 
Industry dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Firm fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regression type  OLS  Fixed effect  First-stage 
IV with 
fixed effects 







 Table 8: Performance: ROA and gender diversity 
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-
2003 which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and 
ExecuComp. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
book assets. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1A. The dependent variable in all 
columns is ROA. The specification in column I includes 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The 
specifications in columns II and III include firm fixed effects. Column III reports the results of the IV 
estimation with Fraction Males with Board Connections to Female Directors as an instrument for 
Fraction Female Directors. The first stage of the IV estimation is the same as in column III of Table 7. 
Column IV reports the results of an Arellano-Bond one step regression. All specifications include year 
dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity in columns I, II and IV. Standard 
errors are adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in column I. Absolute values of t-statistics or 
z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
 
  Dependent Variable: ROA 
 I  II  III  IV 
Fraction Female Directors  6.190*  -6.170*  -231.409**  -159.658 
  [1.89] [1.71] [2.07] [0.81] 
Board Size  -0.327***  -0.276**  -0.189  4.552 
  [2.84] [2.20] [1.18] [0.67] 
Fraction Independent 
Directors 
-3.787*** 1.997 13.719** 30.618 
  [2.82] [1.26] [2.24] [0.28] 
Log(Sales)  2.716*** 4.053*** 4.603***  -25.254 
  [6.09] [8.31] [6.97] [0.86] 
# Business Segments  -0.03  -0.063  -0.049  2.332 
  [0.58] [1.10] [0.70] [0.66] 
Lagged  ROA  . . .  0.271** 
  . . .  [2.55] 
Constant       -1.820 
       [0.47] 
Observations  9324 9553 9553 5656 
R-squared 0.072  0.031  .  . 
Industry dummies  Yes  No  No  No 
Firm fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 






  Table 9: Performance and interaction of gender diversity with the IRRC shareholder rights index 
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003 which were both in 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets-book equity+market value of equity. ROA is net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by book assets. Gindex is the “Governance index” from 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). This index is the sum of 24 dummy variables indicating a firm has a provision making it 
more difficult to be taken over. Data on governance provisions is from the IRRC. Remaining sample characteristics are as in 
Table 1A. The dependent variable in columns I, III and V is Ln(Tobin’s Q). The dependent variable in columns II, IV and VI 
is ROA. The specifications in columns I-IV include firm fixed effects. Columns V and VI report the results of Arellano-Bond 
one step regressions. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors in all columns are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity. Absolute values of robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 
(***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
  Ln(Tobin’s Q)  ROA  Ln(Tobin’s Q)  ROA  Ln(Tobin’s Q)  ROA 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Fraction Female 
Directors -0.103  -5.036  -0.616*  -22.500*  -26.472**  1763.274 
  [0.90] [1.42] [1.87]  [1.92] [2.22]  [0.83] 
Gindex* Fraction Female 
Directors 
. . 
0.055* 1.857*  3.194**  -254.522 
 .  .  [1.69] [1.78]  [2.11]  [0.97] 
Gindex  -0.015** -0.411* -0.019** -0.561** 0.028  21.625 
  [2.17] [1.70] [2.53]  [2.09] [0.10]  [0.94] 
Board Size  -0.005 -0.243* -0.004  -0.233* -0.189  10.398 
  [1.56] [1.91] [1.46]  [1.83]  [-1.00]  [0.81] 
Fraction Independent 
Directors 0.013  3.517**  0.012  3.502**  -3.970**  -96.215 
  [0.28] [2.18] [0.27]  [2.17] [2.15]  [0.41] 
Log(Sales)  0.02 4.740*** 0.02  4.759***  -0.419  -43.412 
  [1.08] [4.55] [1.11]  [4.57] [1.12]  [0.98] 
# Business Segments  -0.002 -0.023 -0.002  -0.025  0.080*  3.840 
  [1.20] [0.62] [1.24]  [0.67] [1.8] [0.83] 
Lagged Ln(Tobin’s Q)  .  .  .  .  0.299** . 
 .  .  .  .  [2.31] . 
Lagged ROA  .  .  .  .  .  0.474 







22.588*** -0.122*  0.177 
  [4.66] [3.45] [4.82]  [3.24] [1.83]  [0.02] 
Observations  7584 7642 7584 7642  4508  4556 
R-squared  0.1 0.055  0.101 0.055  . . 
Regression type  Firm fixed effect  Firm 
fixed 
effect 
Firm fixed effect Firm  fixed 
effect 
Arellano- 










 Table 10: Difference in characteristics between female and male directors at the directorship level 
  
 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 86,714 director level observations from 1,939 firms for 
the period 1996-2003 which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director 
Data and ExecuComp. The IRRC Director data consists of director level data for S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap and S&P SmallCap firms. Tenure is equal to the number of years the director has served on the 
board. Retired Dummy is equal to 1 if the proxy indicated that the director retired from his primary 




Director Characteristics  Mean for  female 
directorships 
Mean for male 
directorships 
Difference 
# Other Directorships  1.088  0.905  0.183*** 
Tenure 7.195  9.987  -2.792*** 
Age 54.761  59.405  -4.644*** 
Retired 0.103  0.192  -0.089*** 
 
 Table 11: Robustness checks using characteristics of directors  
 
Table 11 replicates the fixed effect specifications in columns II and IV of Table 3, column II of Table 4 and column II of Tables 7 and 8 with 
the addition of the firm-year-level averages of four director characteristics: # Other Directorships, Tenure, Age and Retirement Status. Column 
III of Table 11 reports the specification with industry effects but no firm effects of column I of Table 4 augmented by the same average 
director characteristics. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity in all columns. 
Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in column III. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks 








# Board meetings  Ln(Tobin’s Q)  ROA 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Fraction Female Directors  4.874***  0.384*  2.678***  0.732  -0.180*  -5.471 
 [3.29]  [1.87]  [3.83]  [0.91]  [1.84]  [1.55] 
Average Other Directorships  -0.034  0.031 -0.076  -0.161  -0.037***  -0.504 
 [0.17]  [1.11]  [0.86]  [1.37]  [2.72]  [0.77] 
Average Tenure  -0.021  0.005  -0.068***  0.044*  0.009***  -0.117 
 [0.43]  [0.72]  [4.65]  [1.84]  [3.31]  [0.85] 
Average Age  -0.025  -0.001  0.027  -0.014  -0.010***  0.07 
 [0.55]  [0.20]  [1.58]  [0.58]  [3.67]  [0.39] 
Average Retirement Status  -0.974*  -0.117*  0.086  -0.192  -0.001  1.742 
 [1.72]  [1.65]  [0.22]  [0.60]  [0.02]  [1.00] 
Board Size  -0.122**  -0.006  -0.016 -0.018 -0.010***  -0.309** 
 [2.51]  [1.02]  [0.71]  [0.67]  [3.39]  [2.13] 
Fraction Independent Directors  0.294  0.007  0.831***  -0.617*  0.093**  1.835 
 [0.44]  [0.08]  [2.65]  [1.78]  [2.22]  [0.86] 
Log(Sales) 0.780***  0.347***  0.458***  0.402***  0.003  4.151*** 
 [3.55]  [10.60]  [9.01]  [2.96]  [0.17]  [3.96] 
# Business Segments  0.047**  -0.006**  0.029**  -0.014  -0.003***  -0.061 
 [2.26]  [2.38]  [2.23]  [1.24]  [2.59]  [1.59] 
Tobin’s Q  0.092*  0.024***  -0.054***  -0.015  .  . 
 [1.91]  [3.46]  [2.78] [0.69]  .  . 
ROA 0.004  0.003***  -0.016***  -0.015***  .  . 
 [1.19]  [3.35]  [4.94] [3.64]  .  . 
Volatility -2.595***  -0.300**  3.815***  3.661***  .  . 
 [3.00]  [2.42]  [9.18] [5.48]  .  . 
Constant -9.360***  1.201***  5.021  3.890***  1.172***  -24.631** 
 [3.42]  [3.36]  [1.46]  [2.72]  [6.45]  [2.48] 
Observations 7867  8134  8057  8198  9305  9380 
R-squared 0.091  0.224  0.172  0.618  0.109  0.032 
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 